An Uncertain Future: Preventing Mass Atrocities in Uganda

An Uncertain Future: Preventing Mass Atrocities in Uganda explains the factors behind three high-risk scenarios, identifies potential triggering events that could lead to violence against civilians, and proposes recommendations for how to mitigate the risk. 

In studying genocide and mass atrocities, we have learned that they are never spontaneous. They are always preceded by a range of early warning signs. If these signs are detected, their causes can be addressed, preventing the potential for catastrophic progression.  

This report is one of the components of the Early Warning Project, which includes both quantitative and qualitative assessments of atrocity risk. It is the sixth in a series of deep-dive qualitative assessments designed to assist policymakers, NGOs, and members of civil society in understanding the atrocity dynamics particular to the country in question and recommending preventative actions.

Executive SummaryBack to top

IntroductionBack to top

This report assesses the risk of mass atrocities (large-scale, systematic violence against civilian populations) in Uganda over the next one to two years. Since its independence, Uganda has experienced violent political transitions and mass atrocities. At 80 years old, President Yoweri Kaguta Museveni has ruled the country for 38 years through his political party, the National Resistance Movement. Museveni has never spoken publicly about a political transition from his rule or given an indication that he plans to step down anytime soon. Yet, his age, growing public frustration with his rule, and the presidential elections scheduled for 2026 are creating a sense that a transition must be coming. Ugandans are increasingly consumed with questions about when and how Museveni will leave office and who will lead Uganda in his wake. 

The uncertainty around what could be the country’s first political transition in nearly four decades is breeding division and fears about potential violence. Growing disputes over corruption, inadequate public services, and poor management of land and natural resources have also contributed to widespread frustration across communities. These disputes are often perceived along identity lines. In addition, clashes between state security forces (e.g., the police and military) and political opposition, protesters, and youth are common, especially around elections. The previous two presidential election cycles both saw large demonstrations and were marred by violence. Given the current dynamics, there is strong reason to believe that the repression and violence that transpired during the 2021 campaign and election may recur in 2026 or be worse.

Background and MethodologyBack to top

This report is based on research in Uganda from August to December in 2023, as well as on expert consultations and a literature review in 2023 and 2024. The report’s conceptual framework and research questions draw from the atrocity assessment framework developed by the US government. 

Structural Risk FactorsBack to top

Five structural factors—which are longstanding, slow or difficult to change, and create the context in which conflict and atrocity crimes might occur—are at the root of mass atrocity risks in Uganda: 

1. History of mass atrocities: Uganda has experienced mass atrocities and violent political transitions including military coups d’état, civil wars, and communal violence. 
2. Identity-based discrimination and perceptions of exclusion: Ethnic groups from the central, northern, and eastern regions perceive themselves as excluded by the state from economic opportunities and access to resources. 
3. Poor management of land and other natural resources: Mismanagement of natural resources by the state or corporations is commonplace. 
4. Widespread human rights violations and lack of accountability for human rights abuses: Human rights abuses and a lack of accountability to abuses are extensive.  
5. Negative perceptions of state legitimacy: The public holds strong negative perceptions of state legitimacy.

Precipitating Factors of Atrocity CrimesBack to top

In the context of these structural factors, three “precipitating factors”—recent developments that may shift the balance of power, change incentive structures, and further divide groups—are increasing risks in the near term:

1. Uncertainty around a coming transition: Unpredictability around what could be the country’s first political transition in nearly four decades is breeding division and fears about potential violence.
2. Heightened state-led political violence since the last election cycle: In response to political demonstrations, Ugandan security forces have used lethal force against protesters, raising concerns about potential similar actions during the upcoming election. 
3. Escalating restrictions on civil and political rights: State-led attacks against civil society indicate the government’s willingness to violate rights, tend to exacerbate anti-government sentiment, and weaken civil society’s ability to mitigate violence, which may contribute to escalating tensions and increased violence.

Plausible Atrocity Crimes ScenariosBack to top

We identify three plausible mass atrocity scenarios in Uganda. These are “worst-case scenarios,” not inevitable or even most likely outcomes. We describe plausible mass atrocity scenarios to combat the recurring "failure of imagination" often cited in past cases of mass atrocities.  Describing these scenarios can help increase attention on mass atrocity risks and inform policy and programs to prevent a worst-case outcome. In all three scenarios, mass atrocities would be committed by Ugandan state security forces.  Although multiple actors have the potential to commit some violence, Ugandan state security forces have significantly greater capacity to commit atrocity crimes. 

In two of the scenarios mass atrocities would be triggered by large-scale demonstrations. Although it is difficult to forecast the size and durability of a protest movement, we believe increasing dissatisfaction with the state makes it plausible that protests could reach a new level in the next one to two years.

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Recognizing that protests could contribute to a situation in which some actors choose to commit atrocities should in no way be interpreted as discouraging any individuals or groups from exercising their rights to free expression and assembly. Freedom of expression and peaceful assembly are protected under both international law and under the Ugandan Constitution.

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If political and social unrest persist, it is possible that the Ugandan government could determine that the scale or persistence of the protests would justify a more severe response, which could lead to large-scale killing of civilians.

The following scenarios represent how an outbreak of widespread violence could plausibly occur:

• Scenario A: In this scenario, the state would commit mass atrocities against civilians protesting governmental attacks or use of force against the political opposition and their perceived supporters. 
• Scenario B: A perceived illegal political transition by the president or ruling party would trigger political instability and widespread demonstrations. Such a transition would also produce a struggle between the different power centers within the government (e.g., political parties, military). The state would commit mass atrocities against civilians perceived to oppose the transition.
• Scenario C: A clash between nonstate armed groups and the state would trigger large-scale violence against civilians perceived to support these nonstate groups. While violence may be instigated by actors on either side, Ugandan security forces have greater capacity to target civilians on a larger scale.

In addition, we highlight a number of important uncertainties that should be monitored closely, including the tactics of security forces and demonstrators, how violence might spread, and if civilians will be targeted based on their identity.

Resilience and Mitigating FactorsBack to top

Several third-party actors, including religious leaders, the Uganda Kings and Cultural Leaders Forum, and international development partners, have the ability to help reduce the risk of mass atrocities in Uganda. 

RecommendationsBack to top

The report’s recommendations seek to spur both immediate steps to help reduce the threats of large-scale violence and longer-term efforts to address underlying mass atrocity risks in Uganda. These ideas, organized into four broad lines of effort, should serve as a starting point for policy makers and other stakeholders to develop a coordinated and comprehensive plan of preventive action.

1. Manage conflicts through nonviolent means. For example, the Ugandan government should ensure that the police and military operate according to the rule of law and are held accountable for human rights abuses, and civil society should implement programs aimed at discouraging youth from participating in violence and leverage the influence of religious and cultural leaders for peaceful conflict resolution.
2. Ensure the 2026 elections are free, fair, and peaceful. For example, the Ugandan government should support unfettered, independent election observation by domestic and international groups, and international partners should consider conditioning non-humanitarian assistance to the Ugandan government on the government’s organization of free, fair, and peaceful elections.
3. Address underlying grievances. For example, the Ugandan government should convene a national dialogue, and international partners should use coordinated, public and private diplomacy to communicate that a political transition must be free of violence and be carried out in accordance with the democratic principles in Uganda’s constitution.
4. Lift restrictions on civil society members, including human rights defenders and activists. For example, the Ugandan government should protect freedom of association and expression by revisiting restrictive laws.